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WHEN AN IRISH CONVICT SHIP LANDED at Newfoundland in July 1789, the
incident touched off crises for governments on both sides of the Atlantic. A month
earlier the brig Duke of Leinster had left Dublin to transport more than 100 men and
women to an unknown destination, though reports alluded to Botany Bay. After
several weeks at sea fever broke out, supplies ran short, and the ship anchored at Bay
Bulls. Put ashore with minimal provisions, the convicts made their way to St. John’s
and were eventually sent to England. Officials in Dublin and London then argued over
responsibility for the convicts, and the debacle further undermined the Irish system of
transportation to America.1
The affair has received attention from Irish, English and Australian historians but
has yet to be placed in the context of 18th-century Newfoundland.2 Full-length articles
by Ged Martin and Bob Reece repeat many of the stubborn misconceptions about the
island’s government and judiciary. Denied the basic fixtures of a colonial state,
Newfoundland endured the rough justice of fishing admirals and ignorant magistrates.
As Ged Martin concludes, “In the summer of 1789 therefore no firm authority existed
on the island”.3 Given the development of Newfoundland historiography, such claims
are not surprising. The monographs on which Martin and Reece rely — by D.W.
Prowse and A.H. McLintock respectively — were part of the traditional liberal
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approach which saw early Newfoundland as politically backward and legally
anarchic.4 Led by Keith Matthews, historians have since rejected this perspective,
though local government has been seen largely through the lens of imperial policy.5
While Sean Cadigan has established a sophisticated model of economic development,
the function of the pre-1832 state has received little scholarly attention.6 Eighteenth-
century government remains in the shadow of William Carson and Patrick Morris,
both of whom portrayed naval authority as inherently weak and arbitrary.7 Studies by
Patrick O’Flaherty and Christopher English have begun the process of critically
examining the island’s judiciary.8 Yet, on balance, the colonial state is still viewed in
terms of official policies that restricted formal institutions; local customs were merely
stand-ins for the real thing.9
At the heart of events in 1789 rests an apparent puzzle: with extremely limited
administrative and judicial resources, how did the local government cope with what
constituted a large-scale crisis? More than 100 convicts had made their way to St.
John’s, all of whom were in immediate need of food and shelter, many were seriously
ill, and some were dangerous. The incident came at a critical juncture in the island’s
legal development; in 1788-89 problems in the civil courts threatened the entire
judicial system. Yet authorities managed to house, clothe and feed the convicts while
still maintaining law and order. What follows offers a simple explanation: 18th-
century Newfoundland did not have an absence of government but, rather, a different
type of governance, one in which naval and civil magistrates clearly exercised legal
authority and merchants became actively involved when their interests were
threatened. Newfoundland’s criminal justice system had functioned effectively for 50
years before the exigencies of 1789 and would continue to do so until a reform
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movement emerged in the 1820s. Prior to the establishment of independent
newspapers in the 19th century, the island did not have a bourgeois public sphere in
which to debate government policy. This left local officials and merchants to act as
they saw fit.
Government in Newfoundland, as in many other British territories, was essentially
reactive, limited by available resources and shaped by individual initiative. Under
such a regime, official policy was alternatively upheld, ignored or superseded,
depending upon local conditions. When propertied interests became threatened,
however, officials and merchants reacted quickly and decisively. The response to the
landing of Irish convicts represents a chapter in the history of a form of governance
that survived basically intact for nearly a century. In light of the recent renaissance in
the study of state formation in Canada, the case of 18th-century Newfoundland
demonstrates the need to broaden the model of the colonial state to include customary
sources of law and government.10 The absence of modern forms of social control, such
as professional policing and a centralized bureaucracy, did not compromise the ability
of the early colonial state to enforce its authority when the need arose. With the
backing of magistrates, merchants and the military, local government could
vigorously pursue policies without having to answer to an independent press or
elected assembly.
In early 1789 both the British and Irish governments faced the dilemma of finding
a suitable place to ship their convicts. The English system of transportation to
America had ended with the outbreak of the Revolutionary War in 1775, precipitating
major changes in penal practices and an intensive search for another destination.11
England and Ireland pursued different policies toward the Americas: whereas the
former made only three small-scale attempts to resume transportation between 1783
and 1785, the latter sent approximately 1,400 convicts throughout the 1780s. When
news reached London in March 1789 that the settlement of New South Wales had
succeeded, it signaled the beginning of a new era of transportation to the penal colony
at Botany Bay.12 In the meantime, the chaotic system of transportation used by Ireland
had run into serious difficulties: convicts aboard one ship mutinied; another group
rioted while imprisoned in Dublin; and in December 1788 more than 100 convicts
were forcibly put ashore on Cape Breton Island, where seven of them died of exposure
before they could be rescued by local fishermen. Upon receiving a report from Cape
Breton in July 1789, which categorized the incident as “terrifying to the inhabitants of
this infant Colony”, the British Home Secretary informed the Irish government that it
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could transport convicts only to New South Wales.13 Transportation to Britain’s
possessions in North America was now officially banned, but theDuke of Leinster had
already put to sea.
In earlier decades Ireland and England had sent convicts to Newfoundland, but
what occurred in 1789 had only one precedent in the island’s history. In 1730-31 a
brief experiment in transporting English convicts ended when it became clear that the
small settlements along the coast could not absorb a shipload of offenders.14 The
justices of the peace in St. John’s warned the governor about the dangers posed by the
convicts, who were suspected of having committed five murders. Their petition
reflected the relatively weak position of the island’s magistracy, which had been
established only two years earlier:
As we are a constitution not so capable of defending ourselves from such
insults, as others of H.M. plantations, which are under better regulations, and
have men and money for defence and security thereof at the public charge,
we pray that the fear we are in from such bandits may be removed, by their
being obliged to depart this island.15
Governor George Clinton complained to the Board of Trade, and no further attempts
were made to send a British convict ship to Newfoundland, though offenders were
individually transported from West Country ports. Between 1768 and 1774, for
example, authorities at Poole contracted with magistrates in Newfoundland to
transport three felons for seven-year terms.16 A pamphlet published in 1787 suggested
that Britain should transport convicts to Newfoundland, but the government did not
seriously consider the island as a potential penal colony.17
Transportation of convicts from Ireland to Newfoundland had never been officially
regulated. Although no convict ship had landed before 1789, individual offenders had
been illegally contracted to work in the fishery. In 1731 Captain Henry Osborn
reported that it had “become a practice of the masters of ships to bring over here
transported felons instead of Irish servants”, and other incidents likely went
unreported.18 Yet this extra-legal form of transportation did not become serious
enough to warrant further complaints, nor did it constitute “plenty of precedents for
taking convicts to Newfoundland”.19 Convicted offenders and outlaws were often
suspected to be among the hundreds of Irish labourers who came over to work in the
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fishery each summer — in 1766, for example, a group of Whiteboys had reputedly
fled to Trinity to escape arrest — but an entire shipload of Irish convicts had never
arrived.20 As the garrison commander in St. John’s commented in 1789, the influx of
more than 100 convicts was “something so novel in this part of the world”.21
Preparations for what would be the last Irish convict ship sent to North America
concluded in June 1789. As the Dublin gaol filled with offenders sentenced to
transportation, newspaper reports claimed that the convicts were to be sent to Botany
Bay; but the inspector of prisons stated that such a voyage would cost too much
money — reputedly more than £100 per person — to be taken on by the government.
The Lord Mayor of Dublin had contracted the brig Duke of Leinster, owned by Irish
merchants and captained by an Englishman, Richard Harrison, to be fitted as a prison
ship. When the convicts were brought in carts to the waterfront, they offered stiff
resistance, and several jumped overboard while being ferried to the brig.22 The ship
received 102 men and boys and 12 women, brought on board in irons under military
guard, and set sail on 14 June. During the voyage the convicts were chained in
couples, though a defrocked clergyman convicted of forgery was allowed to board a
ship headed for England. The Duke of Leinster had no official destination; one
crewman later testified that he had no idea where the brig was bound. Once the ship
had cleared the Irish Sea it soon became apparent that it was headed for North
America. Rumours circulated that the captain had orders to land some of them in
Newfoundland and the rest in Nova Scotia. Nonetheless, after a month at sea the ship
stood in for the Newfoundland coast, where Harrison searched for a place to dump all
his passengers. Why he chose to put in for the Southern Shore remains unknown, but
the combination of short provisions, illness among the convicts and simple
expediency probably motivated him to get rid of them at the first opportunity. To
cover his tracks, Harrison told them to call the vessel the Charming Nancy, a
notorious convict ship that had landed in Connecticut the previous year.23
On the night of 15 July, 97 convicts were put ashore at Bay Bulls and the next
morning the remaining 17 landed at Petty Harbour. No one was forced off the ship,
and some provisions were off-loaded at Bay Bulls. A few of the convicts monopolized
the food, however, while those at Petty Harbour received none at all. According to a
lurid account published in Halifax, “The hungry victims lived for three days in a state
of warfare, quarreling about their food: the strongest beat the weak, and over a cask
of rank butter, or beef, there was for a time as severe fighting as if a kingdom had been
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at stake”.24 Word of the convicts’ arrival soon reached St. John’s, where early reports
claimed that they had torched a house in Bay Bulls and were advancing up the coast.25
Within days they were walking about the town. Thefts were reported, and fears of a
crime wave quickly arose. One of the convicts, James Reily, was subsequently
convicted at the autumn Assizes for a burglary committed on 18 July and for two
thefts on 4 August.26
Authorities in St. John’s wasted little time in trying to find out who the Irish men
and women were and how they had come to the island. At the court house on 20 July,
the clerk of the peace took an affidavit from Richard Robinson, a disaffected crewman
who had gone ashore with the convicts. Local magistrates then gathered as much
information as possible before acting. Four of the justices of the peace — Archibald
Buchanan, D’Ewes Coke, Jonathan Ogden and George Williams — examined two of
the convicts, James McGuire and Matthew Dempsey. Their answers to the
magistrates’ 18 questions were carefully recorded and sent as an enclosure to the
British government, along with Robinson’s affidavit.27 Within days of the convicts’
arrival, the justices had compiled a fairly complete account of what had happened.
The magistrates’ efforts to amass data on the convicts did not end there. On 7
September they drew up a chart of the identities of 65 of the male convicts which
recorded their age and place of birth; for some of the convicts, it also listed their
crime, sentence, and other applicable “remarks”.28 The information reveals that the
convicts were a typical sample of offenders transported from the British Isles in the
18th-century. Ranging in age from 13 to 55, they were overwhelmingly young: more
than 80 per cent were less than 30 years old. Most had committed various forms of
larceny: 47 per cent of the known offences involved theft of personal property, such
as clothing and tobacco, or farm animals. Two of the convicts appear to have been
professional thieves: John O’Neal, convicted of stealing waistcoats, was described as
“the best shoplifter in Ireland”, while John Keogh was described as “a famous porter
stealer but does not know for what he was tried”. Others had been convicted of serious
felonies — four for robbery and one for burglary — and another, Cornelius
Brosnahan, had been condemned for murder, but his sentence was commuted to
transportation because of “some error in the trial”. At least seven others had received
death sentences and were pardoned on condition of transportation. The convicts came
from 25 different counties — they were concentrated in Dublin (34 per cent) and
spread unevenly across the Irish provinces: Leinster, excluding Dublin (29 per cent);
Ulster (20 per cent); Munster (15 per cent); and Connacht (2 per cent). But the
southern counties were probably under-represented. The majority of the Irish living in
Newfoundland were from Waterford city and its environs: convicts from this area
would have had the best opportunity of assimilating into the local population and were
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perhaps more likely to be among the 37 men not listed by the magistrates.29 When the
convicts were sent to England, the British government relied heavily upon this list and
other documents prepared at St. John’s.30 As an indicator of local government, this
level of record-keeping conflicts with the portrayal of 18th-century Newfoundland as
a “rough-and-ready frontier society”.31
The St. John’s magistrates had many years of judicial experience between them.
All four men sat on the Assize bench as commissioners of oyer and terminer; Coke
and Ogden, who were both surgeons, later became chief justices of the Supreme
Court.32 Surgeons filled the ranks of the magistracy — they were a fixture of the
fishery, providing medical services in every major outport — and the British
government approved this trend because it viewed them as having greater economic
independence than other candidates for office.33 Like justices of the peace elsewhere
in the 18th century, the magistrates were amateurs, with no formal legal training, who
gained a thorough working knowledge of the law through experience.34 While
working as a customs officer in 1786, Buchanan had written an astute legal treatise
for the British government. And Justice Coke, who had served as a magistrate since
1772, was highly regarded as a fair and competent judge.35
The legal system in which the magistracy operated had developed well beyond the
limited constitution provided by statutory law. Under the “Act to encourage the Trade
to Newfoundland”, passed in 1699 and known popularly as “King William’s Act”,
only the fishing admirals could legally hear and determine disputes, though the
commanders of warships sent annually to the island were empowered to act as appeal
judges.36 This statute was largely ignored in practice; local customs emerged in its
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place to meet basic needs; and, after repeated appeals, a naval governor and
magistrates were appointed by royal prerogative in 1729. The dual system of naval
and civil authority experienced growing pains and a struggle for legitimacy but had
become firmly established by 1735. In 1749 Governor George Brydges Rodney
launched an ambitious series of reforms: within two years the island had a local Court
of Oyer and Terminer (an annual assize court that tried felonies at St. John’s), and a
highly organized system of customary surrogate courts (convened in the outports by
naval officers). By the mid-1760s Newfoundland was divided into nine districts,
administered by civil magistrates, and five maritime zones, governed by naval
surrogates. It had many of the standard English institutions used to administer
criminal justice — such as constables, coroners, a sheriff and a grand jury — and the
justices of the peace took recognizances, held petty sessions and organized Quarter
Sessions on a regular basis. By 1780 the colonial state in Newfoundland had evolved
into an entrenched customary regime based on two levels of authority: the seasonal
administration of the royal navy, which had up to nine vessels patrolling the coast
from mid-summer to early autumn; and the year-round sessions held by civil
magistrates.37
On 22 July 1789, the same day the justices conducted their examination of the two
Irish convicts, 13 “principal merchants and inhabitants” met to discuss the impending
crisis. They resolved to petition the magistrates, “fearing, if they [the convicts] are
permitted to range at large it may endanger our property and be the means of
disturbing the peace of this district”. The merchants requested that the convicts be
placed under guard until the governor’s arrival; in return, they committed to render
“every assistance in our power relative thereto and also contribute for their
maintenance and support”.38 According to the magistrates, the immediate danger
posed by the convicts was twofold: they threatened propertied interests while the town
was “crowded with idle persons” during the height of the summer fishery; and, “some
of them appeared much diseased”, thereby bringing the risk of an epidemic at the
worst possible time. In their report to the governor, the justices pointed out that they
had warned the merchants about the problem and then acted in the best interests of the
community in accordance with the expressed wishes of its principal inhabitants.
Knowing that they had no legal authority to incarcerate men and women who had not
committed an offence in their jurisdiction, they carefully stipulated that “we
considered it our duty” to comply with the petition.39
The use of such meetings and petitions was a well established form of governance
in 18th-century St. John’s. Under the common law tradition, justices of the peace
wielded extensive legal powers, whether acting alone, in petty sessions, or at Quarter
Sessions. In most colonial societies that adopted English institutions, magistrates were
the first layer of a larger system of government that included a grand jury, local
corporations or town councils, and an elected legislature.40 However, prior to the grant
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of representative government in 1832, Newfoundland had only the grand jury, which
was limited to issuing presentments during the autumn sitting of the Court of Oyer and
Terminer. The practice of striking ad hoc committees to deal with local problems had
emerged as a substitute for the representative institutions used in other colonies. This
custom dated back to 1711, when Captain Josias Crowe presided over a series of public
meetings of the “commanders of merchant ships, merchants and chief inhabitants and
witnesses”, which approved “several laws and orders made at St. John’s for the better
discipline and good order of the people and correcting irregularities”.41 Marked by a
high degree of cooperation among naval officers, magistrates and merchants, these
informal assemblies were commonly used whenever English mercantile interests
became threatened. In response to the Ferryland riots in 1788, for example, merchants
and the “principal inhabitants” held a meeting, petitioned Governor John Elliot, and
formed a committee to oversee the building of a district gaol.42
Merchants influenced but did not control local government. The meeting held in
July 1789 resembled an Assize session more than anything else: the 13 men who
signed the petition included two commissioners of Oyer and Terminer, the high
sheriff and four grand jurors; three others had served on previous grand juries.43
Merchants and prominent planters had long been involved in the island’s judicial
administration — in 1723 they had temporarily established their own court at St.
John’s — and met regularly with the governor to settle disputes over wages and
prices, though they were notoriously reluctant to serve on juries during the summer
fishery. They presented petitions on a wide array of issues, from customs house fees
to the maintenance of coastal defences.44 Although the social gulf between naval
officers and the mercantile classes has been exaggerated, governors brooked no
challenge to their authority and remained wary of any signs of commercial abuses in
the fishery.45 Yet merchants were also seen as the principal source for funding public
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works; in 1791, for example, Governor Mark Milbanke rebuked the justice of the
peace in Trepassey for using the district’s funds to pay for maintaining the local fort,
pointing out, “if it be necessary that these things should be kept in repair, the
merchants are the proper persons to provide the means”.46 With few exceptions,
Newfoundland merchants considered themselves to be British, sharing the basic
principle of conservative political ideology: a commitment to securing the protection
of property.47 Like the merchant elite of Saint John, New Brunswick a generation or
two later, they rarely became actively involved in government unless their interests
were threatened. Habitually fractious and often divided, merchants tended to unite
when faced with a common threat, thus further blurring the line between private rights
and public justice. When the magistrates acceded to the request to incarcerate the Irish
convicts in 1789, they were not simply “acting at the dictation of local merchants”.48
In the wake of the 22 July petition, the justices took measures to secure the convicts
and protect the town. Health concerns were particularly pressing: the fever brought by
the convicts — “a kind of spotted putrid fever”, according to one observer — appears
to have been typhus, known colloquially as gaol fever.49 A highly contagious disease,
it posed a major threat to the crowded fishing town. James Louis O’Donel, a Catholic
priest who became the first Bishop of Newfoundland, offered a singularly bleak
account:
This is the worst year ever remembered in this country; the low price of fish,
together with the great reductions of the servants’ wages brought the
inhabitants to extreme poverty, and to increase this misery we’ve had a most
malignant jail fever imported to us by some unhappy convicts landed here
from your city, of which no less than 200 people [have] already died in this
Harbour, which is as yet almost an entire hospital. I’ve, the Lord be praised,
as yet escaped it though [it is] of a most infectious and dangerous nature.50
The magistrates decided to place the convicts in a house on the barrens north of St.
John’s. Owned by James Winter, and referred to by the convicts as a “plantation”, the
house was rented for £50. The guard assigned from the army garrison soon became
sick, and a surgeon was contracted to provide medical treatment to the convicts,
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though most of them had apparently become immune to the fever.
Disease was far from the only problem facing local authorities. The task of feeding
80 people every day proved much larger than had been anticipated. Within ten days
the supplies ran out, and the merchants reported that they were unable to provide
sufficient provisions to meet the convicts’ needs. The magistrates then asked
Lieutenant-Governor Elford, the commander of the St. John’s garrison, to lend
provisions from the army’s stores. To justify this move, the justices stressed that
because of the food shortage, signs of mutiny had begun to appear. Elford readily
agreed to offer supplies from the garrison — most of which had already been
condemned as unfit — and the convicts were thereby provisioned until their departure
in October. The final account for feeding the convicts totaled just under 6,000
victualing days and cost £221.
While local authorities managed to cope with the immediate difficulties of feeding
and housing the convicts, the community still felt threatened. Only the male convicts
were incarcerated; the 12 women— “more abandoned than you can conceive of”, one
commentator declared — apparently stayed wherever they chose.51 At least one of the
convicts remained in the town’s hospital, another died in August, two others escaped
from custody, and more than 20 were never accounted for. Keeping nearly 80 men
isolated in a makeshift prison proved to be a near impossible task. A pass system was
established to allow individual convicts to go to St. John’s for medical treatment;
James Reily testified that he had received a pass from D’Ewes Coke and walked to
town on his own. In spite of attempts to regulate their movements, escapes were
bound to occur. At Reily’s trial, John Neale, another of the Irish convicts, testified
about security at the plantation. During the night of 4 August two of the convicts
allegedly told him: “they knew how to get out without being discovered by the guard,
and that they would go to the town on a cruise; that they went out accordingly and
after having been out a considerable part of the night returned”.52
Fears among the townspeople escalated in August 1789 when an attempt was made
to set fire to the town. Local magistrates detained two men on suspicion of arson,
though no one was charged, and they offered a £100 reward for information. Armed
patrols of six men, led by a constable and a “reputable housekeeper”, were ordered to
walk the streets from ten o’clock each night to dawn the next day. When Governor
Milbanke arrived he canceled the pass system and decreed that the convicts could
enter St. John’s only in the custody of an armed guard.53 Six men escaped in October
1789, however, and other breakouts probably went unreported: 65 men are listed as
incarcerated in early September; 74 men and six women were eventually sent to
England; 33 of the convicts who landed in July presumably settled in Newfoundland
or went elsewhere.54 Given the scope of the problem, it is remarkable that local
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authorities managed to ship 70 per cent of the convicts.
Magistrates also had to contend with fears that the island’s large Irish population
would support the convicts over the government. Despite periodic faction-fighting,
the Irish men and women working in Newfoundland were a relatively cohesive group
with a distinct identity, most of whom were bilingual or spoke only Irish.55
Overwhelmingly Roman Catholic, they reputedly had strong Jacobite sentiments and
were repeatedly accused of being disloyal to the British Crown. In 1750, for example,
Governor Francis William Drake had warned that the Irish were “notoriously
disaffected to the Government, all of them refusing to take the Oaths of Allegiance
when tended to them”, and in 1755 fines were issued for hoisting Irish colours.56 One
published account even alleged that, when the French occupied St. John’s in 1762,
“the merchants and inhabitants suffered more cruelties from the Irish Roman
Catholics, than they did from the declared enemy”.57 The colonial state responded to
fears of sedition with judicial force: at the 1762 Assizes Governor Thomas Graves
refused to pardon an Irishman convicted of rape because he had been “guilty of many
treasonable acts during the time the French were in possession of this place”.58 No
open rebellion occurred until 1800, when part of the local garrison mutinied in support
of the United Irish Rising, but tensions loomed beneath the surface.59 Although none
of the Irish convicts had been convicted of political crimes, they came from a country
of mounting civil unrest.60 At the trial of James Reily, the court heard that he had
declared he “did not care for any prosecution that could be carried on against him in
Newfoundland”.61 Further encouragement to deport the convicts as soon as possible
came when a sergeant was court-martialled for allowing a group of convicts to escape
in October 1789.62
The landing of the Irish convicts occurred at perhaps the worst possible time for
the island’s government. By July 1789 a series of problems in the civil courts had
burst into a large-scale crisis, threatening the customary judicial system on which the
governors had relied since 1749. The debacle stemmed from a prosecution brought in
Exeter against Governor Richard Edwards for a decision he delivered in 1780 during
a sitting of the Governor’s Court; this court heard the bulk of major civil actions and
functioned similarly to the Courts of Chancery held in other British colonies.
Edwards’ successors refused to sit as judges for fear of being prosecuted in England,
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and this left a gaping hole in the administration of justice. As a customary institution,
the Governor’s Court had no formal legal basis other than the appellate jurisdiction
granted to naval officers by King William’s Act. Governor Milbanke summarized the
crux of the matter: “it would be imprudent of me to risque my reputation and fortune
in defence of a custom, which, if not a bad one, had never been legally sanctioned”.63
Efforts were made to transfer the governor’s customary jurisdiction to three other
courts — the Fishing Admirals’ courts, the sessions held by the justices of the peace
in the outports, and the Vice-Admiralty Court at St. John’s — but none proved
practicable. This left the naval surrogates to shoulder an increasingly heavy case-load,
yet their powers also derived from customary law. At the Devonshire Quarter
Sessions in 1788, Richard Hutchings, an English merchant, appealed a decision made
by Captain Edward Pellew in a surrogate court. The judge ruled that Captain Pellew
had no legal authority to hear Hutchings’ case, thereby undermining the foundation of
the surrogate system that had governed the outports in various forms since 1701.64
In April 1789 this imbroglio deepened further when Hutchings’ solicitor brought
an action against Captain Pellew. Pellew appealed to Admiral Mark Milbanke, who
was to begin his first year as governor that summer, to help him secure a defence
lawyer from the British Admiralty, explaining that it would be “extremely cruel to
subject me to such an expense for having simply done what I conceived to be my
duty”.65 Aaron Graham, who had served as civil secretary to the Newfoundland
governors since 1779, intervened on Pellew’s behalf. Explaining the history of the
island’s customary judiciary, Graham asked Admiral Milbanke to arrange for the
Crown’s law officers to consider the entire matter. Milbanke did not receive the legal
opinion until 24 July, the day he was to set sail from Spithead in HMS Salisbury.
According to the report, neither the governor nor the surrogates could legally sit as
judges in civil causes.66 This placed Milbanke in an extremely difficult position: on
the one hand, word of Hutchings’ prosecution had already reached Newfoundland,
where naval officers were unwilling to hear the scores of writs that had accumulated;
on the other, the British government had neither constituted a new jurisdiction to
replace the surrogate courts, nor provided instructions on how to administer justice in
the interim. Even before he set foot on the island, then, Milbanke’s administration had
received its first blow.
Upon arriving in St. John’s on 4 September, Governor Milbanke discovered that
the legal conundrum was the least of his worries. On 8 September the justices of the
peace presented their written report on the convicts’ arrival and the measures taken to
secure the safety of the town. To justify their actions, the magistrates stressed three
points: there were no precedents for how to respond to the landing of a shipload of
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transported offenders; the convicts had brought a highly contagious disease which
threatened the townspeople; and a meeting of the merchants and inhabitants had
declared their property to be in grave danger. Milbanke commended the justices for
acting “very prudently”. Though fully aware of the questionable legality of detaining
men and women who had not been convicted in Newfoundland of any crime,
Milbanke judged the dangers posed by their presence to be the more important
consideration. By complying with “the desire of the inhabitants”, he explained, the
magistrates had prevented “many irregularities in the fishery which would have been
the consequence of suffering such a banditti to go at large about the Island”. But
Milbanke also identified two outstanding problems: where to send the convicts and
how to pay for it. The former he committed to take on himself, “and trust to His
Majesty’s approving my conduct therein”, while the latter would be the community’s
responsibility. Milbanke directed the magistrates to convene a meeting of “merchants,
traders, and inhabitants”, and to propose a plan whereby half of the expenses would
be paid by St. John’s and half by the other districts around the island.67
In pursuing this course Milbanke was following imperial policy. The “Act for the
encouragement of the Fisheries carried on from Great Britain”, passed in 1775 and
known colloquially as “Palliser’s Act”, clearly prohibited persons who were not
indentured servants from remaining on the island after the summer fishery had
ended.68 Year-round settlement by planters and their servants had never been
proscribed — in fact, the migratory fishery depended in large measure upon the
resident population, which had grown from around 3,000 in 1720 to more than 10,000
in 1785 — but the British government wanted to prevent surplus labour from
accumulating during the winter.69 Servants who lived in Newfoundland without a
written contract to serve under a master were referred to as “dieters”, a designation
that linked idleness with a propensity for crime and social unrest.70 In 1764 Governor
Hugh Palliser had promulgated a penal code designed to control the mobility of
labourers, the majority of whom were Irish Catholics. “For better preserving the
peace, preventing robberies, tumultuous assemblies, and other disorders of wicked
and idle people remaining in the country during the winter”, Palliser ordered:
That no Papist servant man or woman shall remain in any place where they
did not fish or serve during the summer preceding.
That not more than two Papist men shall dwell in one house during the
winter, except such as have Protestant masters.
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That no Papist shall keep a publick house or vend liquor by retail.
That no person keep dyeters [dieters] during the winter.
That all idle disorderly useless men and women be punished according to law
and sent out of the country.71
This decree, which magistrates were to read at Quarter Sessions each year, was
renewed by Governor John Byron in 1770. Enforcement varied according to
administrative initiative: governors and surrogates enforced or ignored proclamations
as they saw fit. In 1777, for example, an order forbade Irish women from coming to
Newfoundland but this was not widely enforced.72
Added to these restrictions was the uneasy relationship between the colonial state
and Roman Catholicism. Attitudes of governors ranged from tolerance to outright
prejudice, but local authorities did not actively pursue religious persecution until
1755, when Governor Richard Dorrill outlawed the saying of mass to allay fears
arising from the murder of a St. John’s magistrate the previous year by an Irish gang.
Yet Dorrill’s draconian penal code was the exception rather than the rule. His
successors adopted a modus vivendi which developed into limited toleration in 1779
and a formal grant of “full liberty of conscience” by Governor John Campbell in 1784,
though the status of Roman Catholicism remained insecure. In 1786, for example,
while serving as a naval surrogate at Placentia, Prince William Henry (later William
IV) physically assaulted Father O’Donel. The faction-fighting in Ferryland, and
O’Donel’s ongoing dispute with an itinerant priest, also threatened to undermine the
church’s position with the government. O’Donel had established a sound relationship
with Governor Elliot but had to start from scratch when Milbanke arrived.73
It is not surprising that Governor Milbanke determined from the outset that the
convicts had to be deported from Newfoundland. Milbanke wanted to uphold the
regulations governing the movements of masterless servants. Following established
policy, he strictly forbade the “harbouring or entertaining of dieters”, and warned that
“persons coming from other parts of the Island to St. John’s to remain the winter as
dieters will be punished as vagrants and sent back from whence they came”.74
Milbanke also viewed tolerance of Catholicism as an encouragement to Irish servants
to settle in Newfoundland after they had served out their contracts. Determined to
check the recent trend toward greater religious freedom, he refused O’Donel’s request
to build a chapel in Ferryland.75 Equally important, with a resident population of less
than 3,000 people, St. John’s could not readily absorb an influx of more than 100
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convicts: unlike economies with a relatively high demand for labour, such as in
Maryland and Virginia, there was little work on the island after the summer fishery
had ended.76 From the governor’s perspective, therefore, the dilemma was not whether
to get rid of the convicts but rather how to pay for it.
Unwilling to act unilaterally, Milbanke waited for a response from the St. John’s
committee before taking further action. At a meeting on 14 September, a committee
of 12 men, seven of whom had attended the 22 July assembly, proposed to raise a
local tax to pay for deporting the convicts.77 The duties would be ten shillings for each
merchant ship or banker, four shillings for each four-man shallop, two shillings
sixpence per skiff, and three shillings for each inhabitant. Milbanke had no statutory
authority to impose these duties, since Palliser’s Act exempted fishing ships from
taxation.78 The plan also meant that the island would apparently endure “taxation
without representation”, a practice widely condemned as unconstitutional.
Nonetheless, Milbanke eagerly promoted the new tax as a means to finance a project
vital to the island’s security. On 16 September he sent a circular letter to justices of
the peace in each district in Newfoundland, directing them to collect the duties
recommended by the St. John’s committee.79
Milbanke’s decision to impose taxation in Newfoundland was neither a rash nor an
unprecedented move. A recent claim that the levy represented an extraordinary and
illegal measure distorts the legal context in which the island’s government operated.80
The 1778 Colonial Tax Repeal Act applied only to taxes levied by the king and
parliament of Great Britain, leaving colonial assemblies relatively free to impose local
assessments.81 Whether an ad hoc committee constituted an equitable form of
representative government remains debatable, but it certainly was not without
precedent. The question of whether the island’s government could legally impose
local taxation arose originally in 1730, after the first governor, Captain Henry Osborn,
had ordered a levy to pay for building a prison at St. John’s. Facing stiff opposition
from some merchants, Osborn referred the matter to the British government. The
Attorney General ruled that the tax contravened both King William’s Act, which
designated the fishery a free trade, and the English jail-building Act, which authorized
an assessment only upon a grand jury presentment.82 While stipulating that the
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governor should not act “without the consent of some assembly of the people”, the
Attorney General acknowledged that “so far as the people have submitted to this tax,
there may be no occasion to call it in question”.83 The Board of Trade reassured
Osborn that it approved of “all the steps you have taken there for preserving the peace
and tranquility of the inhabitants”.84 Successive governors imposed taxation usually
after some type of consultation with merchants and other prominent townspeople.
By 1789 the custom of raising local taxes had become a firmly established part of
the government’s mandate. Governors encouraged magistrates to collect duties to
fund construction of court houses and jails, or to defray costs arising from criminal
trials, throughout the island’s districts: Placentia (1757-58), Harbour Grace (1765,
1771), St. John’s (1772-73), Bonavista (1774-75), Bay Bulls (1775), and Trinity
(1758, 1777-78).85 Taxes were regularly raised locally in Placentia, for example,
where magistrates convened meetings during the annual sitting of the Surrogate
Court. As the minutes of the Placentia court indicate, warrants for tax collection
comprised a standard element of the naval surrogates’ jurisdiction:
Whereas upon the representation of the principal inhabitants that a tax is
absolutely necessary for the repairing of the gaol, keeping up the railing of
the church yards, the support of the poor, and other necessary services for the
publick that may occur, [the court has] ordered a tax of two shillings to be
levied on every boatkeeper, fisherman, and servant employed in the fishery
in the district of Placentia, for the above services to be continued for one year
only.86
In other instances, such as in Trinity in 1758, governors authorized the justices of the
peace to use fines to pay for public works.87
Once Milbanke had secured the backing of the St. John’s merchants, he vigorously
worked to collect the tax. Pointing out that the convicts posed a major threat to the
fishery, he asserted that everyone on the island was “equally interested in getting rid
of such a banditti”.88 He empowered the district magistrates to fine those who did not
comply, citing the Vagrancy Act as legal authority.89 Under English law, justices of
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the peace exercised summary jurisdiction for offences such as vagrancy — a single
justice could incarcerate “idle or disorderly” persons — and two magistrates could
authorize local assessments in conjunction with the overseers of the poor.90 When
informed of the affair, officials in London made no comment on the legality of
Milbanke’s initiative. As long as there were no social disturbances, petitions from
merchants or remonstrances in parliament, the British government remained content
to allow Newfoundland governors to take care of local problems as they saw fit.
In the meantime, Governor Milbanke also confronted the breakdown in the civil
courts. Unsure of how to proceed, he asked Aaron Graham for advice on how to
administer justice under the cloud of Hutchings’ suit. Graham recommended that
Milbanke use the clause in his governor’s commission empowering him to appoint
judges and magistrates — specifically commissioners of oyer and terminer and
justices of the peace — as a basis to establish a Court of Common Pleas to settle the
petitions and writs that had accumulated. Graham later testified that this rather
spurious use of the commission was designed so that, “as little alteration as possible
might be made from the old mode of proceeding”. As he explained it,
[Governor Milbanke] appointed the captains of the ships of war to be Judges
at the out ports on their respective stations, so that they only changed the
name of Surrogate with that of Judge, and continued to do the business
exactly or nearly in the same manner as they had before been used to it; the
principal alteration was in the appointment of the court at St. John’s, where,
instead of sitting as a Judge himself, he appointed three gentlemen to sit as
Judges.91
On 17 September Milbanke appointed seven men, including Graham, to be judges in
the Court of Common Pleas, three of whom — Coke, Ogden, and Buchanan — were
already serving as justices of the peace.92 Courts of Common Pleas were duly held in
the districts of Ferryland and Harbour Grace in September and October 1789.93
Pronouncing the new courts an unqualified success, Governor Milbanke reported:
“during my short stay there they decided in the most formal manner near thirty causes,
without meeting with the smallest obstruction”.94 In spite of such optimism, the
British government had not sanctioned this legal innovation. Like the decision to
deport the Irish convicts, Milbanke would have to wait until he returned to London to
secure approval for his reforms.
On 20 September Milbanke sent his report to William Grenville, Home Secretary
in the ministry of Pitt the Younger. He began by stressing that prior to 1789, “open
and professed villainy, it seems was little known” in Newfoundland, but had risen
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dramatically since the Irish convicts had arrived. “Unless the greatest precautions are
taken to prevent it”, he warned, “the spirit of thieving will soon find too good root in
the Island to be eradicated”. In addition to noting the dangerous fever brought by the
convicts, he was careful to emphasize that he had received no directions from the
British Admiralty and had consulted with the “principal merchants of this town”
before taking any action. “My present intention”, Milbanke concluded, “is to send the
convicts to Spithead with directions to the person having the charge of them to wait
the commands of one of His Majesty’s ministers”.95 He enclosed all of the documents
relating to the affair — from the depositions taken in July 1789 to the advertisement
for a vessel to ship the convicts posted on 17 September — and sent the British
Admiralty a full copy.
Milbanke’s decision to ship the convicts to Spithead reflected his intention to deal
only with the immediate problem of deporting the Irish convicts. No evidence exists
to support the assertion that he sent the convicts to Portsmouth, instead of Plymouth,
which was closer to Ireland, out of hopes that they would then be sent to New South
Wales.96 On the contrary, Spithead, the anchorage off Portsmouth, had been the
standard destination of warships returning from the Newfoundland station, either
directly or via Lisbon, throughout the 18th century.97 Milbanke remained well aware
of the potential fallout from his decision — hence the careful documentation — but
focused solely on the pragmatic difficulties within his own jurisdiction. He did not
have the luxury of time: all the necessary preparations had to be made before the
autumn departure of the fleet and the onset of harsh weather conditions. Further,
Milbanke had no legal prerogative to justify deporting the convicts either back to
Ireland or to another British territory. And if he allowed them to stay he would
endanger not only the safety of the townspeople but also the lives of the convicts
themselves, who would be hard pressed to find sufficient food and shelter over the
winter. Given this limited range of options, sending them to Spithead represented the
most defensible course of action.
In October 1789 the numerous arrangements for deporting the convicts were
completed. The advertisement for a ship had stipulated that the master provide
“between 60 and 80 men and women” with sufficient food and water for an Atlantic
crossing. Robert Coysh, master of the Dartmouth brig Elizabeth and Clare, signed a
contract with the governor on 23 October. Milbanke directed Coysh to notify William
Grenville upon his arrival and then to await further orders from the British
government. He also ordered John Lee, barrack master of the St. John’s garrison, to
deliver to Coysh forty beds and blankets.98 Not surprisingly, the final cost of
Convict Transportation and the Colonial State in Newfoundland 113
95 Milbanke to Grenville, 20 September 1789, CO 194, vol. 41, pp. 27-28, PANL.
96 The speculation by Martin and Reece about Milbanke’s conduct places a false importance upon penal
policy. They both ascribe to the Newfoundland governor responsibilities and concerns far exceeding
anything Milbanke was likely to have either considered or attempted. See Martin, “Convict
Transportation to Newfoundland”, p. 93, fn. 51; Reece, “Irish Convicts in Newfoundland”, p. 19.
97 The navigation at Plymouth was also much more difficult than at Spithead. See N.A.M. Rodger, The
Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy (Glasgow, 1986), p. 49.
98 CO 194, vol. 41, pp. 42-43 (advertisement for a ship, 17 September 1789), CO 194, vol. 38, pp. 114-
117 (contract between Coysh and Milbanke, 23 October 1789), GN 2/1/A, vol. 12, p. 54 (Milbanke
to Lee, 21 October 1789), PANL.
incarcerating, treating, feeding and shipping the convicts proved to be extensive.
Among the charges to the government were £50 for renting Winter’s house, which
was “very much damaged,” £10 for medical services, £73 for navy slops to clothe the
convicts, over £200 for food supplies and £400 for chartering the brig. The total, at
least £775, amounted to more than half the entire civil establishment voted for
Newfoundland.99
By early October Milbanke knew that the fund-raising efforts would fall short.
Collecting duties on each ship and person proved too large a task to be undertaken
quickly, and Milbanke’s report to the Admiralty on 30 September noted that he had
encountered some opposition to his plans.100 Half of the island’s eight districts
(excluding St. John’s) cooperated while the other four did not respond to the
governor’s directive. The governor received £184 from the outports: £90 from
Harbour Grace, £54 from Trinity, £20 from Placentia and £20 from Trepassey.
Milbanke had to pay the balance out of his own pocket and was later compensated for
£226. The contribution of St. John’s remains unclear but presumably accounted for a
portion of the remaining £365.101
Although Milbanke claimed to be disappointed by the lack of support for his
scheme, the response from the island’s merchants and planters was decidedly mixed.
Admitting that the plan proposed by the St. John’s committee “does not seem
agreeable to the inhabitants of the other districts,” Milbanke informed the Ferryland
magistrates that they could raise the money in whatever manner “the merchants and
inhabitants shall think proper”.102 He asked that the portion for their district, estimated
at £90, be collected without delay, but received no reply. Many merchants and
planters in the outports doubtless felt that the convicts did not threaten their interests
— or no longer did so — yet others were willing to cooperate as much as possible. In
September a committee of merchants met in Harbour Grace to discuss the plan for
deporting the convicts and informed the governor that they would raise the required
funds. Milbanke assured them that he had “nothing more at heart than the public
good”, confessing that the entire affair had given him “infinite trouble and
uneasiness”.103 Shortly before leaving for England, Milbanke wrote personally to the
Harbour Grace merchants to “entreat of them to accept of my best thanks”.104
On 24 October the Elizabeth and Clare sailed from St. John’s harbour with 74 men
and six women on board. Governor Milbanke departed St. John’s shortly thereafter in
HMS Salisbury, and both ships made the Atlantic crossing in less than four weeks. On
17 November William Grenville received the papers sent by Milbanke, and the
Admiral himself was in London two days later. While the convicts remained aboard
the ship anchored at Portsmouth, the British government responded to the situation.
Grenville drafted a warrant authorizing Coysh to transport the convicts to Ireland and
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sent this to Lord Thurlow, the British Lord Chancellor. A meeting of the
government’s lawyers, including the Attorney General, was discussed but Thurlow
proposed that the government order Coysh to proceed straightaway to Ireland and
inform Dublin after the fact. The brig was apparently in poor condition, however, and
leaking too much to leave Portsmouth without repairs.105
On 25 November Grenville notified the Irish government of what had happened.
The situation presented a potentially serious dilemma: if the convicts appeared in
Ireland before the expiration of their term of transportation, they were in theory guilty
of a capital offence. Grenville stated the government’s intention to send the convicts
directly to Dublin, contending that they could not be convicted of returning early from
transportation because they had not done so willingly. He also made one point clear:
“our lawyers here all agreed that the proceeding thus far is perfectly legal and
regular”. Taking the opportunity to urge the Irish government to stop sending convict
ships to the Americas, he affirmed: “you may depend upon it that, after the example
set them by Admiral Milbanke, none of our Governors will suffer any of these people
to be landed in their governments”.106
The Irish government protested strongly against the plan to send the convicts to
Dublin. John Fitzgibbon, the Lord Chancellor of Ireland, pointed out that Ireland had
“for time immemorial” sent convicts to the British colonies in America.107 He further
noted that if the convicts landed in Ireland either they would indeed be guilty of a
capital offence or, if unwillingly returned by order of the British government, they
could not be legally detained by Irish magistrates. Fitzgibbon asked that no action be
taken until the legal quandary could be ironed out. On 1 December, Robert Hobart,
secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, presented Grenville with the Irish
government’s position. He cited an Irish statute passed in 1786 authorizing Ireland “to
send convicts to any of his Majesty’s plantations in America”.108 Hobart asserted that
the Newfoundland governor thus had no justification for his actions, observing that
Milbanke had admitted that the convicts had committed no offence to justify their
incarceration in July 1789. “Should the Government of England support Admiral
Milbanke”, Hobart declared, “the Parliament of Ireland will be much pressed to resent
it as a national indignity”. He ended by disclosing that the government had dispatched
a revenue cruiser to prevent the convicts from being landed in Ireland.
Milbanke thus found himself at the center of a political battle between the British
and Irish governments. On 2 December Dublin repeated its attack on the
Newfoundland governor. Fitzgibbon asserted that Milbanke “has done an act highly
indiscreet at best” and caustically remarked that the Admiral would never deign to
come to Ireland nor to “feel any comments which our worthy Whigs may make upon
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him”.109 Grenville ignored the virulence but pounced on the fact that Ireland was
entitled to transport convicts only to a British colony. In a statement often cited by
historians, Grenville declared:
Newfoundland is in no respect a British colony, and is never so considered
in our laws. On the contrary, the uniform tenor of our laws respecting the
fishery there, and of the King’s instructions founded upon them goes, as I
apprehend, to restrain the subjects of Great Britain from colonizing in that
island. I am not quite certain, but I believe that this policy is carried so far as
even to authorize the Governor to remove by force the British fishermen who
may show a disposition to settle on the island, and remain there during the
winter.110
He was asserting that since the convicts had not been transported to a British colony,
their sentences had not been legally executed. The Irish government could therefore
detain the convicts in Dublin and arrange to transport them somewhere else.
Grenville’s statement represented no more than an attempt to solve the immediate
problem of the Irish convicts and formed neither a general nor an accurate statement
on the operation of the island’s government.
The disparity between official imperial policy and the actual administration of
Newfoundland was larger than the Irish government could have imagined. In official
terms, Newfoundland was not a colony but a seasonal fishing station. It was, to repeat
a hackneyed quotation, “a great English Ship moored near the Banks during the
fishing season, for the convenience of the English fishermen”.111 On the other hand,
as Keith Matthews has demonstrated, implementation of policy varied considerably
according to economic pressures and political expediency.112 Domestic politics and
European imperatives determined the course of British colonial administration far
more than the particular legal or political concerns of the colonies themselves.113 John
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Reeves, the first chief justice of the island’s Supreme Court, decried the neglect
fostered by the West Country merchants: “The consequence has been, that
Newfoundland has been peopled behind your back; you have abandoned it to be
inhabited by any one who chooses, because you thought appointing a Governor would
constitute a Colony and encourage population”.114 Reeves exaggerated both the
influence of English merchants and the degree of official neglect — as recently as
1786 the British government had received a detailed report on law and government
and the island’s growing population — but he accurately identified the gap that
existed between policy and practice.115
On 9 December 1789 Grenville reiterated his position that Newfoundland’s status
as a mere fishing station meant that the convicts’ sentences had not been carried out.
To back his claim he cited “the Act of William and Mary and that of 1773 respecting
the fishery there”.116 Not surprisingly, Fitzgibbon replied that he was unable to find
any 1773 act (Palliser’s Act of 1775), but he had perused King William’s Act and its
provisions for “temporary property” in Newfoundland. Yet Grenville’s scheme had
the desired effect. Fitzgibbon reported that the Irish government had recalled the
revenue cruiser and, while still maintaining that Milbanke had acted improperly,
informed Grenville that he had reconsidered the affair in light of the fact that
“Newfoundland is not a British colony”.117 Betraying a mistaken impression that
settlement was strictly forbidden in Newfoundland, which British officials were not
about to correct, Fitzgibbon conceded:
Certainly, if the King’s subjects are by law prohibited from remaining in
Newfoundland after the fishing season, with a view to prevent them from
interfering with the persons who carry on the business of the fishery, this will
go a great way to justify Governor Milbanke in the act which he has done;
and if we are enabled to stand upon his conduct as justifiable by the laws of
England, I am ready to agree with you that the British Government could not
dispose of our convicts in any other way than that in which I fear they have
already been disposed of.118
With the primary legal obstacle removed, the crisis diffused, and the Irish convicts
were finally returned to Dublin on 21 January 1790. “I am in great hopes”, Hobart
wrote to Grenville, “that you have given us a loop hole [sic], which will get us out of
the scrape”.119
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The loophole provided by Newfoundland’s legal status proved to be sufficient.
Though the fate of the Irish convicts remains unknown — Bob Reece has traced 12
of them in a shipment of convicts transported from Cork to New South Wales in 1791
— the affair was over as far as the island’s government was concerned.120 Able to
return to his crusade for legal reform, on 31 December 1789 Governor Milbanke
submitted a comprehensive report to the Home Secretary and the Committee of the
Privy Council for Trade. Compiled by Aaron Graham, it outlined the problems in the
civil courts and argued strongly in favour of the Court of Common Pleas.121 In
response to petitions by West Country merchants against the new court, Milbanke
reiterated his case in February 1790.122 Yet London took no action: in July 1790
Milbanke appealed to Grenville that the Admiralty had ordered him to sail for
Newfoundland, but he had not received any word about his proposed reforms.123
Belatedly, the Committee of Trade heard the report of the Attorney and Solicitor
Generals, both of whom ruled that the island’s Court of Common Pleas was “not
founded on any authority legally given to the said Governor, and cannot be supported
or justified by law”.124 The British government then informed Milbanke that it would
not constitute any new courts in 1790, directing him instead to rely upon the justices
of the peace to hear civil cases.125 When Milbanke returned to Newfoundland he again
operated the Court of Common Pleas and — not for the first time in the island’s
history — official policy was subordinated to administrative expediency.126
When legislation was passed in 1791, it provided only for a temporary court of
civil jurisdiction. The Judicature Act was limited to one year, during which John
Reeves, the newly-appointed chief justice, would assess the requirements for the
administration of law in Newfoundland.127 In November 1791 Reeves prepared his
first report on Newfoundland’s legal system in which he sketched plans for a new
judiciary. He concluded by recommending that the British government establish some
type of legislature in Newfoundland. Specifically, Parliament “should give out of its
hands, a small portion of its Legislative Authority and confer it, where it can be
exercised with more circumspection and effect”. Reeves continued:
I propose that the Governor of Newfoundland should be authorized with the
advice (but not to be controlled by such advice) of a certain number of
persons not being more than five justices of the peace, five merchants, five
boatkeepers, and five other persons, whom he may please to summon
(meaning to select some out of the different classes of men in the Island) and
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the Chief Judge and two Assessors of the Supreme Court, to make bye laws,
and regulations.128
In his second report, however, he abandoned the concept of a legislature in favour of
more pragmatic measures. After visiting the outports in 1792, he affirmed, “I am
convinced, from what I there saw, that there is less need of regulations than of persons
to execute them; and that instead of making new laws, we should first find a new set
of magistrates to execute the old ones.”129 In the wake of the Hutchings affair in 1788-
89, naval officers had withdrawn from their customary position as sole surrogate
judges. Civilians began to fill the surrogate bench after 1791, though the governor and
his junior officers remained active in local government.130
Chief Justice Reeves’ recommendations formed the basis of Newfoundland’s
constitution for the next 30 years. In 1792 a second Judicature Act created a supreme
court for both civil and criminal jurisdiction, and entrenched legally the system of
surrogate courts that had long operated customarily.131 Again the act was for one year
only and had to be renewed annually until 1809.132 The British government was trying
to close the gap between imperial policy and local practice, but it did so by tailoring
law to available legal resources. Far from being seen as an aberration, this preference
for local customs conformed to the English common law tradition. As Reeves
explained to the House of Commons in 1793:
It is a peculiar property of the law of England to give sanction and effect to
local usages and customs that have prevailed for length of time. If the law of
England is the rule of decision in Newfoundland, the customs and usages of
Newfoundland would thereby become established, because the law of
England opens and receives the customs and usages of the place into itself as
a part of it, and the usage and custom would then become the law of the land
by virtue of the force and efficacy given to them by the law of England.133
Existing institutions, such as the surrogate courts, were favoured over innovations, in
particular the Court of Common Pleas. The administration of justice in pre-1792
Newfoundland therefore appears to have been largely customary, often ad hoc, and in
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many respects contrary to statutory law. Does this mean, as liberal historiography
suggests, that the island’s government was necessarily primitive, corrupt or simply
absent?
The short answer is no. As the response to the landing of Irish convicts
demonstrates, government in Newfoundland — consisting of magistrates, merchants,
the civil secretary and the naval governor — reacted effectively when confronted with
major problems. This is not to suggest that the administration of pre-1832
Newfoundland was socially just or even particularly fair; the inequities noted by
Patrick O’Flaherty were indeed by-products of an absence of representative
institutions.134 It is, however, to argue that the model of Newfoundland simply as
politically backward cannot account for the events of 1789, nor for earlier examples
of administrative initiative and local taxation. Despite the declaration by Grenville
that Newfoundland was in no sense a colony, London knew that settlement,
government and law operated year-round after 1729. In addition to annual reports, the
British government received detailed representations in 1718, 1765-66, 1786, and
1789-92. The statements made by British officials during their debates with Dublin in
1789 cannot be separated from the specific political context of the Irish convicts
crisis.
Ironically, government in Newfoundland functioned essentially the same in 1789
as the legislative model proposed by Reeves in his first report. Governor Milbanke
consulted the justices of the peace and the merchants, who had formed a committee,
before issuing instructions and continued to solicit their cooperation until his
departure in October. The limited administrative apparatus in 18th-century
Newfoundland both inhibited governors’ abilities to act unilaterally and encouraged
the process of working with magistrates and merchants. With neither an elected
assembly nor an independent press to monitor or question decisions, governors were
relatively free to act as they saw fit. They had no vested economic or political interests
to protect locally, aside from their naval squadron, and they were comparatively free
of the parochial politics that eclipsed many colonial governments. Since their
appointments were usually for three years — prior to 1818, they resided at St. John’s
only from mid-summer until the departure of the naval squadron in early autumn —
they seldom embarked on ambitious administrative projects. Accountability to
London tempered this political autonomy: as Milbanke discovered, the British
government periodically rejected local initiatives, though it rarely reprimanded
governors. Pragmatism guided the implementation of imperial policy to a greater
degree than statutory law or mercantile tenets.
The reforms of 1791-92 were not rungs in a teleological ladder of legal progress.
Government after 1792 continued to function basically as it had during Milbanke’s
tenure. When the next large-scale crisis hit Newfoundland in 1816-17, magistrates,
merchants and the governor again managed the local response. In the face of
disastrous fires, waves of bankruptcies and outbreaks of civil unrest, merchants in St.
John’s organized public meetings, established a committee and proposed measures for
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the immediate relief of the community. These efforts were remarkably similar to the
actions taken a generation earlier. In January 1817 Captain David Buchan, a resident
surrogate magistrate at St. John’s, convened a public meeting to nominate a
committee, consisting of merchants and other “gentlemen”, which acted as an
informal legislature; it passed a series resolutions that included the division of the
town into a system of wards.135 Merchants also appeared before a parliamentary
committee to advise the British government on the situation in Newfoundland.136 With
the growth of a local reform movement and the establishment of an independent press
in the 1820s, however, this system of governance was no longer sustainable.137 The
creation of a bourgeois public sphere meant that government policies were for the first
time subjected to critical evaluation in local newspapers.138 When a broad coalition of
reformers and merchants formed to protest against “taxation without representation”
in 1828, it pressured London into giving Newfoundland an elected assembly four
years later.139
The events in 1789 shed light on why the structure of governance in Newfoundland
remained intact for such an extended period of time. The success in coping with the
influx of Irish convicts illustrated the ability of local government to protect propertied
interests. From the 1730s to the 1820s the governor, magistrates and merchants
constituted a de facto legislature and executive to approve and enforce local policies.
This arrangement was limited to specific projects, such as the building of court houses
and other public works, or defraying the cost of criminal trials. Merchants did not
become significantly involved in local government unless they perceived their
interests to be directly threatened, as they did in 1789, 1817 and 1828. From London’s
perspective, government in Newfoundland functioned relatively well, cost
comparatively little and caused few political problems. When the island’s governance
briefly occupied the centre of a dispute between London and Dublin in 1789, the
British government used Newfoundland’s lack of colonial status as a political
loophole. Britain’s policy toward the island was not wholly neglectful, nor was it
inherently repressive or particularly enlightened. Rather, it followed the path of least
resistance until forced in 1791-92 to legislate the minimum changes required for a
functional judiciary. An act passed in 1811 conferred limited property rights; the 1824
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Judicature Act bestowed piecemeal reforms; and the 1825 Royal Charter awarded
official colonial status but did not provide for representative institutions beyond a
town corporation.140 The British government was highly skeptical about establishing
a local legislature in 1832 and did so only when spurred by a determined reform
movement.
The development of law and government in 18th-century Newfoundland
demonstrates the inadequacy of employing a narrow model of the state. A generation
ago Ralph Lounsbury suggested that the island endured a limited political and legal
system because it had a primitive society in which there existed neither need nor
demand for representative government.141 Recently, Christopher English has argued
that by 1815, “only the rudiments of a state had been achieved”.142 Yet to stress the
island’s anomalous legal status cannot adequately account for the evolution of local
government before 1832. More specifically, to conflate the growth of civil society
with the operation of an effective colonial state obscures the function of customary
institutions. With three layers of authority — the governor’s office at St. John’s, the
surrogate courts in the districts, and the sessions held by justices of the peace — the
system of policing and punishment in Newfoundland was as strong as that in many
other rural societies. In colonial America and the early Republic, state authority was
generally weak and institutional coercion relatively limited compared to Great Britain.
Local law-enforcement and penal practices varied markedly from region to region; in
Upper Canada too the central government had difficulty enforcing its authority in
rural townships.143
Finally, the story of the Irish convicts bears on the problem of defining the colonial
state. To view government from the altitude of imperial policy overlooks much of
what was happening on the ground. “The state”, as Michael Braddick contends, “is
not a purely institutional phenomenon”.144 In other words, it comprises much more
than the sum of its bureaucratic parts. Given the range of available resources and the
nature of local conditions, the seasonal judiciary of the naval governor and his junior
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officers provided a remarkably effective administrative regime. The involvement of
merchants and magistrates in local government — particularly their use of ad hoc
committees — formed a substitute for the formal institutions granted to most colonies
in British North America.145 If the island’s customary sources of legal authority are
considered as parts of the colonial state, the relative effectiveness of the magistracy in
coping with the landing of Irish convicts can be clearly discerned. The malleability of
the common law tradition had allowed 18th-century Newfoundland to develop a legal
system that met the needs of those in power.
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